Creativity – an indispensable component of nature

Creativity – an indispensable component of natureKarl Edlinger[1] & Wolfgang Friedrich Gutmann ϯ[2]

Introduction

In the past centuries and decades more and more people came to realize that the world in its total structure, even apart from the human history, does not remain static in a constant state. It is characterized by a constant change. This takes place at different levels at different speeds, but runs through all world events. Numerous thinkers recognized this.

About this change, this dynamic, often and in many places, brings with it the development of something fundamentally new, which is why in this context, in analogy to the processes of change in human societies and the often profound changes they bring about, one can speak of creative change or simply creativity.

Although the term creativity comes from the human world of experience and thus from the domains of religion, philosophy and psychology, it is used, albeit as a metaphor, very successfully in the biological sciences, especially when it comes to the behavior of animals and plants (this be especially emphasized, because even plants show behavior, albeit at different speeds than animals) as well as phylogenetic changes. With regard to the latter, some aspects of the life of bacteria and viruses have to be subsumed under Creative, because through their changes, they can repeatedly exist threatening situations (think of bacteria resistant to antibiotics) and open up new opportunities for life.

For the human sphere, Shulamith Kreitler (2017) defines creativity as follows:

“Creativity is defined as the production of something that is both new and meaningful. The Output may be concrete, or abstract, specific or general. New is a relative adjective and defined in the framework of some framework….“

[1] Inhabitant of Leonding/Austria, formerly Curator Museum of Natural History, Vienna and Lector at the University of Vienna.

[2] Wolfgang Friedrich Gutmann was a biologist, founding father of the Frankfurt School of Phylogenetics and Professor at the Goethe-University in Frankfurt/M, Germany. He died in 1997. Parts of this contribution go back to him or were worked out together.

This definition can, from a different point of view, also be taken over by the natural sciences, especially biology, evolutionary science and prebiotic.

Under the term meaningful, in the sense of the author, who is a biologist and deals with questions of tribal history and evolution, may be understood all, every change that leads to the preservation of living organisms and their transformation to greater vitality and stability. As meaningful in this context, then those processes have to be considered that led to the development of living organisms in general.

Above all, it became increasingly clear that not only the phylogenetic transformation of living beings, but the earth, the entire cosmos are subject to a continuous dynamic, a permanent dynamic, called creativity.

The unity of nature and mankind

One of the most common misconceptions about the role of science is the idea that science studies nature and that the result of scientific endeavors is the explanation of natural processes and the creation of a picture of nature. The modern sciences have evolved in a long historical process since the Renaissance, in which, ignoring the bewildering diversity of nature, by strictly methodical action, certain aspects and partial mechanisms of reality have undergone an experimental and observational examination. That the modern natural sciences could develop already presupposed a picture of the world and nature; it was expected that the structure of nature was determined by mathematical relations and determined by lawful relations. But the assumption that there are laws of nature as causal causes and mechanisms of action has a theological basis that Needham has worked out. It was only by pretending to believe in a Creator that it made sense to assume that the world was structured and ordered according to principles of law (Needham 1993).

It was on this basis that the foresight, which in some respects still prevails today, emerged, starting from a lawfully ordered cosmos in which strict laws govern the course of celestial bodies as well as events in inanimate and animated nature. In this mechanistic-determined world view, the question of the genesis, the emergence of the natural contexts, did not arise. It is not possible to speak of organisms or of subjects. In a world in which bodies interact according to physical laws, corpuscles move in fields, all relationships are formalized, there are no organisms as separate entities distinguished from other physical objects. Complex phenomena, such as nature offers everywhere, represent what is still unexplainable and reduced to simple formalizable relationships. The world of physics was, until recently, still historically devoid of many facets. She designs the picture of a frozen order.

Kant has expressed this with the dictum that he recognizes only the starry heaven above him and the moral law in himself. Here, the separation of the material order, the aspect of the res extensa, and the organism-psychic event, the res cogitans, becomes clear. On this Cartesian basis, the unity of man and nature can not be thought, for it is not even possible to determine the position of man in nature. It is also a disadvantage of this picture of nature that it does not provide an assessment basis for the solution of burning environmental problems. Many philosophers have clearly shown this within the scope of this lecture series. Thus, I can assume their general statements here.

Physics finds history again Only slightly overdrawn is the designed image, but it marks the starting point and the contrasting foil of a new thinking that is currently unfolding in physics and allowing nature to appear in a different, more dynamic light *. In fact, there are aspirations in physics to work out new aspects of natural phenomena. In a recent branch of thermodynamics of open systems, we no longer study simple law relations and equilibrium processes. In situations far from the thermodynamic equilibrium with constant supply of matter and energy, nature shows rather a spontaneity and a tendency to create new order and to let the regulated process unfold to growing complexity. If one believes Prigogine (1979), then a new age in the understanding of nature will begin, the statics of traditional physics will be overcome, the historicity in nature, meaning, of course, that of natural science, will be rediscovered. Aspects of the natural process, which were blinded by traditional abstraction, return to the horizon of contemplation.

The natural-philosophical perspective In our remarks, we do not want to pursue this development of physics, which is really important for the understanding of nature, but to point out new fundamental theorems and principles in the description of nature, which also appear in other natural sciences and are developed to ever greater clarity. This may sound as if we wanted to express that natural-philosophical insights were gained in the natural sciences, and that the natural sciences in some respects took on the role of philosophy. After the presentation of some content aspects, we will mitigate this impression, but not take it back gant. In fact,we think that today natural sciences are forced to do philosophical work. You have to work out important basics of the declaration of nature independently. Philosophy is largely concerned with philology and the interpretation of ancient approaches; Obviously no new problems are expected with regard to the natural philosophy. Well, was not it announced that the time of great metaphysical designs had passed? We doubt it, claiming that a new understanding of nature and natural phenomena is emerging. It should be marked with the terms dynamization, processualization and creativity. The transition to a new understanding of nature does not only take place in physics; it has been developing for decades in other sciences as well.

A very impressive process model of geology is plate tectonics. In general, little attention has been paid to the fact that geology has made room for a profound and revolutionary re-foundation of geological history. Based on the fundamentals of continental drift theory by Alfred Wegener, which was first presented in 1913, the theory of „plate tectonics“ prevailed in the 1970s. It describes and explains the distribution of the continents on the surface of the earth from an event that is driven by underlying mechanisms in the Earth’s crust and causes shifts on the surface. It is based on earlier conceptions of Holmes from the 30s, based on the fact that heat generated by radioactive decay ascending through the upper layers of the earth, in the mantle under the crust convection rolls in motion. The convection rollers accelerate the transport of heat to the surface of the earth in the ascending areas, but also generate laterally directed forces when the liquid material flows below the outer crust. The convections act as transport mechanisms on the crust.

In the course of the processes described by plate tectonics, fissures and fractures break up, some of which are in the middle of the oceans, often appearing in their initial stages on continents. In these fissures, which surround the earth in a wide network, liquid magmatic material from the deeper layers penetrates and forms new seabed. This process of regeneration proceeds at the same pace as the drifting apart of the older floes. Of course, the surface of the earth is not sufficient for an unlimited further growth of the floes. These are pressed against each other at their feed. One plaice then sinks, is pushed under the other, whereby it partly digs for the education deep sea and after its filling with sediment comes to the pushing on and unfolding of mountains under the influence of gigantic forces. The compression causes so mountain formation or sinking and remelting of the floe.

In the field of clumping, the crust is destroyed, bent and folded into mountains, the material is melted down. In columns, magma penetrates and sets in motion Vuikanismus. The pushed up and unfolded in the course of the folding in Bruchsehollen decomposed mountains are subject to erosion by the influence of the atmosphere. The weathering debris fills large basins and also the deep-sea trenches.Based on the lawful mechanisms, it is now possible to reconstruct the evolution of the continents and oceans as well as the essential phases of orogeny from a long-running process.Starting from a continent called Pangea, over the last 200 million years, an orderly process of disassembly into drifting plaques has become the continent of today, with seabed between them. The explanation of the shape of the continents and the position of the oceans can thus be obtained through the reconstruction of preconditions and processes and represented in model form. It seems interesting that the entire picture of the earth thus appears as a process and in the flow, but nonetheless keeps on creating the same open spaces on earth. In spite of all transformation, invariance shows itself in terms of general geophysical conditions and also in the nature of the spaces usable for the life, an aspect, which is of the highest importance for the development of the life. Since long Aonen remain in the context of the dynamics of the earth happening permanently the same living and living spaces, in which life can develop according to its own internal characteristics.

For its part, the geological event is embedded in the historical development of the planet Earth, the evolution of the earth, with all its autonomy, takes place in a planetary framework and, moreover, in a cosmological event which can also be grasped historically. In this historicity, the precedent situations determine the most consequential. It becomes on this basis a necessary sequence of events representable and explainable. The models create a large-scale process idea and make world areas that have long been regarded as fixed. Remain to discuss in what the revolutionary principles of natural philosophy exist, which have triggered such a profound paradigm shift in geology. The following points, which should also be considered in the following, seem important: The natural process is represented as energetically driven. This is a necessary consequence of the law of conservation of energy. In the context of geology and geophysics, natural phenomena can also be driven differently than energetically and caused by an energy change. Furthermore, it is important that the earth works like a machine and its action comes from itself. It is recognizable internal operation, which affects the transformation of a structure. There is a structure which directs the driving forces in their effect, which is recognizable geologically in the form of morphology. It is the mechanical coherence of the earth machine which, in the presence of the energetic drive, directs the displacement of the crust parts and floes.

Creativity

This dynamic happening in and on Earth provides the framework in which life occurs and in which the transformation of living things, both at the level of individual organisms and generally, as evolution, takes place.

Changes can be different. Individual changes such as growth, maturation or metamorphosis usually follow a long-term pattern and in many individuals the same pattern. This is not creative. Also the manifestation of a typical behavior for the respective species does not contain any elements of creativity.

Likewise, the change in feature abundances in different populations, an increase or decrease in average size, or average levels of staining are not signs of creativity.

Of course, this also applies to all physico-chemical processes outside living beings, except in cases where they are caused and effected by other organisms, for example when the level of a watercourse rises due to the activity of beavers

The situation is different when living things suddenly change their behavior or their structure. And in such a way that they deviate clearly from the routine.

This can have different causes.

A mutant change that has a positive or at least neutral effect on the life of the organism and allows new options of behavior or relationship to the environment. Such events are extremely rare.

The activation of previously unused behavioral options through new challenges.

A functional change in individual organs, that is their use away from the routine. This change can, if it affects larger groups of organisms and lasts long enough, go into the usual behavioral repertoire of the population or species.

A look into the world of living organisms shows that such „creative“ processes occur in all groups, be they plants, animals, fungi, bacteria or even viruses. However, creative change in all has a different character and also different degrees. One can certainly speak of a „scale of creativity“. This indicates that they can be both minor and profound creative changes that occur before different time horizons.

The transition from wind pollination to insect pollination in flowering plants was certainly a highly creative process, but it took a long time and many thousands of generations. But at the end there was something fundamentally new.

This applies to all phylogenetic conversion processes (Edlinger 2000, Edlinger & Gutmann 19994, Edlinger, Gutmann & Weingarten 1989, 1991, Gutmann & Edlinger 1991 a, b, 1994 a, b, c, 2002). Genuine tribal-historical change can only be talked about when something new is actually created, when organs change their main functions and if this also manifests itself in changes in the structure.

However, there are also evolutionary dead ends in which nothing fundamentally new can arise. A good example of this are many parasitic worms, whose body construction is so extremely specialized that changes would most likely lead to extinction.

Changes in DNA sequences can only be described as creative changes if they allow new or additional benefits.

But creative change also takes place at the level of communities, through interaction. Good, impressive examples of this are the first symbioses. By incorporating the metabolism and the drive of powerful bacteria (Gutmann Edlinger 1991a, b; Margulis 1998), even at the bacterial level, large new types of organisms have emerged, which are based on the evolution of eukaryotic organisms with cell nuclei (plants, animals, fungi ) stood. More or less close co-operation of different plant-animal or mushroom-species are described by the ecology. Biosemiotics has begun to explore and present the signals that are exchanged for coordination. In the meantime it has become apparent that plants also interact with each other in a lively exchange of signals (Baluska, F. & S.Mancuso 2009, Baluska, F. Lev-Yadun, F & S Mancuso 2010, Baluska & Mancuso [Ed.] 2018 Mancuso, 2018, Bonabeau, E., Dorigo, M. & G. Theraulaz 1999, Mancuso 2018). Two very impressive examples may be mentioned: swarm intelligence and the insect states of hymenopterans and termites. Swarm intelligence occurs among other things in many socially living birds, in fish and also in growing plant roots. The exchange of few acoustic, optical, mechanical or (in the case of plant roots) chemical signals is sufficient to produce highly complex patterns of behavior or coordinated growth. Social living birds and fish usually protect themselves from predators, the plant roots prevent an energy-consuming chaos during growth.

The insect states are enduring communities with a strict division of labor that often manifests itself in a variety of physiques. Communication takes place via chemical, haptic and optical signals. Some of these forms of communication allow the community to have very complex, cooperative behaviors, as well as building well-functioning, intricately constructed structures. Highlights of this complexity and thus creativity are the buildings of ants and termites. One of the most important steps that one can not dispute creatively creatively was the creation of living organisms. This was, as plausible reconstructions show, in many steps.

The extinctions by volcanism or meteorite impacts

Promoting and increasing the creativity of the organism realm has been caused by large, worldwide catastrophes caused by volcanism or impacts of large meteorites.

The last of these impacts occurred about 65 million years ago in today’s Gulf of Mexico. The long-term darkening of the biosphere following him (the revived layer lying around the surface of the earth and in the uppermost layers) resulted in mass extinction. In the liberated habitats, for example, the dinosaur, flowed other life forms that had previously led rather a shadowy existence.

It came to stormy developments, splitting the remaining life forms, in the case of the succession of dinosaurs for the evolutionary splitting of mammals and birds. This is an example of many.

These evolutionary differentiations produced a variety of new life forms that opened up new environments and created new ecosystems. One speaks in such cases of radiations. And these radiations unfold, from the perspective outlined here, an enormous potential for creativity.

Of course, the framework of general dynamics and creative change of organisms also demands a different view of the history of the tribe than that offered by the previously dominant, adaptation-thinking, old Darwinian theory of evolution.

Creative change is only conceivable if organisms are understood as largely autonomously acting entities and not, as in traditional Darwinism, as a blueprint, impression or kneading of the outside world. In the sense of Uexkull (1921, 1928, 1980) it must be assumed that every organism constitutes its own environment. Compatible with this view, in contrast to Darwinism, is the Theory of organismic Construction and its view of evolution.

The theory of organismic constructions
This theory conceives organisms as hydraulic systems (Gutmann 1988a,b, 1991, Gutmann & Bonik 1981, Edlinger 1989, 1991a,b). Hydraulic systems are under pressure of the fluid filling, which is surrounded by dense and flexible membranes. This causes a tendency to assume a globular shape. All deviations from this rule, i. e. non globular shapes of organisms or of their parts are enforced by tethering fibers, by surrounding packing rings, also consisting of fibers or by hard skeletal elements, secreted by glands or gland-like structures. Organisms are converters of energy and matter, which are deformed permanently by shortening of fibers, by energy-consuming gliding of actin-myosin-complexes. They can regain their length only in a passive way. Fibers are working in an antagonistic way against other fibers or against the fluid filling and its surrounding membranes. Permanent deformations are generated by these mechanisms which cause the injection of energy into the environment. Contraction of fibers is elicited by stimulations, produced by pacemaker systems [Edlinger (1991b)]. Contraction and restitutive expansion must be coordinated in a high degree. This is possible, because fibers and also microtubules composed of proteins form scaffolds, which have an additional effect in the enforcement of form.
The cellular and extracellular scaffolds can also be used for anchoring of contractile fibers. Enzymes can bind to them and compartimentation, as a primary condition of an effective metabolism, is achieved. So we can conclude, that organisms are highly ordered arrangements of mechanical and chemical elements, which are strictly adapted to their function within the organisms (Edlinger 1994). Mechanical structures function as frameworks for all other parts and components of the living machinery. This mode of internal „adaptation“ is the only one, which can be legitimately discerned in the kingdom of organisms. In the frame of the organismic machinery genetical and physiological mechanisms depend on the mechanical framework, i. e. the organismic construction. They are functioning as parts of its construction, supporting its activities and its permanent self-regeneration.
All reproduction activities must be seen as an aspect of energy conversion in the construction. The production of spermatozoans and eggs consists of energy driven formation processes. It results in the formation of separate mechanical constructions, which are able to develop into complex organisms. Ontogenetical development is also an energy driven process in mechanical constructions that is strictly guided by mechanical constraints. The differentiation of cells and tissues and the constitution of body architecture is only conceived as enforced by mechanical stress.

Autonomy of organismic constructions
The mechanical energy driven framework of the organism has, in the case of animals, a great deferability, which is becomes effective in motility, propulsion, capture of food, expulsion of waste, and blood circulation. Locomotory deformations can display a variety of modes in dependence on the working construction. Motoric patterns are useful, if there is no conflict between the actions of different components. Similar to some machines, the propulsive apparatus can be used in different ways. The only demand is, that deformations remain adequate to the constraints given by the organismic construction. The different deformations must be harmonized in a high degree. A manifold options of locomotion become manifest in a high degree of organismic autonomy. Autonomy as resulting from energy driven activity of constructions is not consistent with the basic tenets of molecular reductionism and totally at variance with the Synthetic Theory of evolution.

Relations with the environment
If we accept the hydraulic and mechanic nature of living beings, the interdependence of all organismic levels and the predominance of the organismic construction is apparent. The living being has the form of a well defined apparatus which is moved by its own intrinsically generated deformations on the basis of energy consumption and under the influence of internal pacemakers. Actions of organisms have a predominant internal aspect. All actions are performed in relation to external and environmental factors (Gutmann & Edlinger 1991a, b). The constitution of the organismic construction and its mode of functioning determines the external „contacts“ and the organismic interdependencies with the environment. The environment can only be actively conquered by the organisms. Environmental factors must never be understood as externally generated forces or constraints working on the organismic constructions. There is no adaptation generating influence of the environment (Edlinger, Gutmann & Weingarten 1989, 1991). The constructional properties of the organismic units and their mode of working are responsible for survival, reproduction and even the death of organisms in their habitats.

Epigenetics

In the last two decades, it has been shown that besides the „classical“ mutation of the genetic material DNA and sexual recombination there is another type of change, the epigenetic (Jablonka & Lamb 2005, Kegel 2009). This is to block certain sections of DNA. Blocked under external influences and mainly by addition of methyl groups (CH3). Thus, not only the views of J. P. Lamarck (2002) on heredity, but also those of Smuts (1927), Darwin (1868), Haeckel (1875) and Kammerer (Koestler 1971) are partially rehabilitated. The gene blocks can be inherited further. Under certain circumstances, they could also gradually become genetically fixed, analogous to the so-called Baldwin effect. This would allow another form of creative change. So far, however, this is only subject to plausible considerations.

The most important result of all evolutionary theoretical considerations is that organisms are highly autonomous. The extensive self-determination in their environment enables their creative development in the first place.

Creativity on other levels of being

The conditions given here also apply to other, non-biological, levels of development, both for the prebiotic, physicochemical, phase before the evolution of living organisms, and for the evolution of the perceptual apparatus and the psyche, especially human, based on organic evolution. and for their creative development.

The evolutive development of the perceptive apparatus and the psyche was reconstructed on the basis of the Organismic Design Theory by Edlinger, Gutmann & Weingarten 1989, Edlinger 1991, 1992, Edlinger & Gutmann 2002, Gutmann & Edlinger 2002.

In these reconstructions, in addition to the other evolutionary requirements, above all the far-reaching autonomy and self-determination of the living organisms, including the perceptive and striving for knowledge, came to bear. This means that they largely approached the points of view of constructivist epistemologies. These are mainly due to the works of E. v.. Glasersfeld, H. v. Foerster, H. Maturana, F. Varela and S. j. Schmidt, though the latter, especially those of Marurana and Varela, are based on self-organization concepts, strangely empty, as seen from the point of view of biology. Maturana and Varela speak instead of self-organization of autopoiesis, but their concepts are very abstract and have little relation to reality, to real existing organisms.

Ernst v. Glasersfeld, for example, describes the point of view of radical constructivism as follows:

Ich verstehe unter “Wirklichkeit” ein Netzwerk von Begriffen, die sich in der bisherigen Erfahrung des Erlebenden als angemessen, brauchbar, oder “viabel” erwiesen haben, und zwar dadurch, daß sie wiederholt zur erfolgreichen Überwindung von Hindernissen oder zur begrifflichen “Assimiliation” von Erfahrungskomplexen gedient haben.

(I understand by experience a network of concepts that have proved useful or „viable“ in the past experience. This is because they have repeatedly served to successfully overcome obstacles or to conceptualize the assimilation of experience complexes.)[3]

That such an epistemological viewpoint includes the possibility of constantly trying and creating something new is self-evident. But that’s exactly where the creativity is themed again.

Karl Ernst von Baer

In many ways, the philosophy of perceptions and cognition of Estonian biologist Karl Ernst von Baer may also be regarded as a forerunner of constructivism. V. Baer explains his view of perception, interpretation and cognition among others with the following example:„Suppose we find a notebook in the middle of Africa …. We show it to a local chief or a bushman (San) who has not seen anything European, and ask him what he thinks this is. ‚These are dry leaves‘, he may say … .We travel on and come to a Hottentot who has some, if only indirect, contact with European colonists. ‚That’s paper,‘ he’ll say … he’ll probably notice that there are so many straight lines and black dots on the paper. He may suspect a magic formula. We will later come to a European colonist, a Boer. He will not doubt that there are notes, but his insight does not go further. In Cape Town we meet a trained sound artist and ask him what that is. … He will immediately read the music, reproduce it and say: ‚This is Mozart’s overture to the Magic Flute or Beethoven’s Symphony in this or that key.‘[4]How to see here, depending on the respective cultural milieu, sometimes quite creative and in the given context also meaningful, but very different interpretations of the sheet music presented, which certainly differ in the first two cases certainly from the intentions of the author. As seen here, depending on the respective cultural milieu, sometimes quite creative and in the given context also meaningful, but very different interpretations of the sheet music presented, which certainly differ at least in the first two cases of the intentions of the author.

Karl Popper

It has not yet been made an issue, but there is a connection between the ideas of the radical Constructivists and the philosophy of knowledge Karl Poppers (1974). Its fallabilistic method also exists, as a first step in the preliminary solution of a problem, in the formulation of a theory about the question under discussion, that is, a creative process. The following constant criticism of this theory either leads to its refutation or to its improvement in the form of a presumed further approach to the truth, which can definitely be described as further creative activity.

Psychology

From a different perspective than biology and philosophy, psychology looks at creativity. Kreitler & Kreitler, S. (1983, 1990a, b), Kreitler (2017), Kreitler & Casakin (2009), Ward (2007) Finke, Ward, & Smith (1992), Torrance (1992) 1974) Simonthon (2000) and Sternberg (1988).Kreitler’s (2017) definition, quoted in her first sentences above, continues, focusing specifically on the psychological dimension:

„Creativity is defined as the production of something that is both new and meaningful. The Output may be concrete, or abstract, specific or general. New is a relative adjective and defined in the framework of some framework[5] (e. g. specific plant, technology, scientific domain) or relative to a given number of people (e. g. family, community, country, humanity at large): Meaningful is defined in operational, functional or ideational terms…..

….According tot he Kreitler model of creativity, creativity is a multi-process and multi-dimensional phenomenon….

….Accordingly, the general comprehensive model of creativity consists oft he following levels: cognition, motivation, emotion, personality, health, bdehavior, and the environmental context. Notably, the first six levels referto the creative person, whereas the last levelrefers tot he environmental context in which the creative person functionsaand which includes the family, the work place, the creativity domain, and the culture.“

At the heart of Ward’s (2017) conception of creativity seems to be the following definitions:

“Creative cognition seeks to move beyond traditional psychometric approaches to ununderstanding creative thought, such as relying heavily on fluency and flexibiliy scores from divergent thinkingtests as indicators of creative functioning. …

.. As a general guide to developing studies of creative processes, the creative approach makes use of a convergence strategy….. Two types of processes will be used in this paper to illustrate the creative cognition approach: accessing existing conceptual knowledge at various levels of abstraction… and combining previously separate concepts…

… Creative activities clearly rely on accessing stored knowledge, but some ways of accessing knowledge may be more conducive than others to the development of original ideast hat diverge from those that have come before.“

This extended scope now includes dimensions that are in the specifically human domain.Although all the necessary facilities, talents and abilities are based on precursors in the animal kingdom of the past, in the course of their tribal history people have developed specific mental abilities that strongly distinguish them from the rest of the living and animal world.The differences lie in the increased ability to think and reflect as well as in the thinking in symbols and in the construction of symbol worlds, which can be passed on the way of the cultural, not the biological, heredity. On this basis, Ernst Cassirer (1923 – 1929[6], 1945, 1988, 1194 a, b, c) developed his philosophy of symbolic forms, in which both the natural biological endowment of man and his cultural development based thereon were analyzed.As symbolic forms Cassirer differentiates above all language, myth, religion and scientific knowledge. They stand, in different combinations with each other, for different stages of cultural development and thus also for different expressions of cultural and civilizational creativity, thus in general also of human creativity.Although Cassirer’s work reflects many details and contains a comprehensive account of human intellectual and creative work, and also reflects the art in great detail, it must be remembered that the knowledge of Cassirer’s lifetime is dealt with. It remains for future investigations to determine which forms of genuine creativity will result primarily from the rapidly developing computer sciences, that is, how far and in what form the stage of mere user software is exceeded and new dimensions of the creative can be opened up.

Prebiotic and the emergence and evolution of early life

Below the level of comolality of bacterial, plant and animal life we have to locate the known inorganic world as well as the disappearance of prebiotics. The emergence of the latter can only be achieved through reconstructions. Reconstructions that are more or less clinging to the speculative.

How the first completed, liquid-filled bubbles surrounded by membranes is still in the dark, but there are several comprehensible theories between which the final decision has not yet fallen. Since life evidently evolved out of non-living matter, ultimately, and here the approach of Whitehead’s philosophy below, this creative potential also has to be endorsed.

The gradual emergence and development of early proto-organisms and organisms represented a fundamental transition to new forms of organization of matter and energy fluxes. In those aggregates, from which gradually, gradually, the earliest functional and reproducible organisms were formed, made a transition to new laws which did not override the physicochemical regularities, but saddled them up. We can therefore speak of an autonomy of life. Organisms form from the beginning of their evolution on a framework that allows for special physical-chemical processes that do not occur in the so-called inorganic nature.

This happened without the physical and chemical laws that had and are valid in the inorganic world ever having been broken. Only on their basis did new laws of life establish themselves.

Erwin Schrödinger[7] explains this with the metaphor of the metals copper and iron, which, despite their familiarity with the metals, must appear alien to a steam engine designer who sees an electric motor for the first time and to use hitherto unknown physical principles. Consequently, this leads to the conclusion that so-called natural objects in the first place reach their specific existence from their connection in which they are embedded, that is, from very specific framework conditions. This premise, which is actually compelling for our understanding of Western science, has the disadvantage that such scientific methods can be applied directly only for a narrow range, namely, in this case, the methodically and technically controlled sections of the infinitely more diverse world and wide ranges of the living Nature, but especially the historical events, can not grasp. On the other hand, it shows metaphorically that there actually exists the development of new, higher-ranking laws, and that, just as in mechanical engineering, we can speak of the emergence of new laws and thus also of creativity in the evolution of life.

The framework conditions for the emergence of lifeBelow the complexity level of bacterial, plant and animal life, we have to think of the inorganic world we know as well as the disappearance of prebiotics. The emergence of the latter can only be achieved through reconstructions. Reconstructions that are more or less clinging to the speculative.Schrodinger (1944) already speculated on a connection between life and thermodynamic states. He postulated conditions as a precondition for the existence of living organisms far from the thermodynamic equilibrium, the maintenance of which depends on energy input.Finally, on this basis, Ilja Prigogine and co-workers developed the theory of dissipative structures that existed far from thermodynamic equilibrium (Nicolis & Prigogine 1977, Prigogine 1992, Prigogine 1998, Prigogine & Stengers 1993)[8].

These develop, as can be shown by relatively simple experimental arrangements, a certain degree of order and show at certain, energetically predetermined points of their development changes that can run in different, at öeast two, directions (bifurcations). Thus, in each case, there is something new in principle, one can certainly speak of a creative behavior analogous process of change. The framework created by such dissipative structures now allows new laws to be established, which, as already emphasized, are saddled up with the physicochemical but never injure them.

As an illuminating example, the so-called Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction is frequently cited, in which suddenly, dynamically changing and repeating color patterns arise when certain reagents and energy are added (Zhabotinsky 1974).

These equilibrium-distant states of dissipative structures are considered by interpreters (see Jantsch 1980) as examples of self-organization. It is alleged that they can be regarded as models for ordering active, energetic arrangements of matter. For an order, as it was established according to the ideas of many scientists in the early stages of life development, as a high degree of necentropy in the sense of thermodynamics.

So this theory of dissipative structures can now be applied to the early conditions of the Earth’s surface. At the time when it came after a long cooling phase by energy from the interior of the earth, from volcanism and also from the sun to reasonably stable, but nevertheless everywhere far removed equilibrium states.

More complex structures could be formed where either by gaps in submarine rocks or by membrane and bubble formation in the sea locally isolated milieus emerged, which ensured at least temporary stable physicochemical processes. This provided the basis for further developments. Reconstruction attempts of these early processes were often undertaken, for example by Gutmann and Edlinger (1994a, b) Edlinger and Gutmann (1992) as well as Gutmann and Edlinger (1992). Development is progressing rapidly in this prebiotic field, but it can and must be assumed that such profound change is a highly creative process.

„Ironic“ sciences?

The development of the last decades, however, also has its dark side, which is currently expressed mainly in the theoretical coverage of living organisms, and thus, in this connection, as organism-theoretical deficits. Life is unilaterally defined reductionistically by molecular genetics, which in turn is Darwinist. Thus, organisms suddenly become „vehicles of genes“ (Dawkins 1974), whose sole function is to conserve and reproduce certain genetic structures. Other approaches are based on physicalistic models (prigogins, hooks) or replace living things, as part of an ambitious research program called „artificial life“, without further ado, through simplifying computer programs, in which then – „experimental“ – evolution after very simple, Darwin in in many respects beyond radicalization and thus falsifying premises (Gleick 1988; Haken 1981, 1990; Haken & Wunderlin 1986; Meinhardt 1978, 1987; Prigogine & Stengers 1981; collective presentation by Langton 1998).

John Horgan (1997) spoke of „ironic sciences when he looked at those“ sciences „that are almost entirely computer-based, far from natural reality, and that also applies to a different way of looking at change and creativity, the emergence theory Konrad Lorenz (1973) used the term „fulguration“ instead of emergence.By emergence, the founder of the theory, H. L. Lewes (1875), understood the spontaneous appearance of new unexpected properties of systems as a result of the interplay of their elements. These new properties may also be unpredictable in principle or at least for lack of knowledge.
This is overlooked by the representatives of this view that the term in most cases only obscures ignorance, that emergence always comes into the discussion when there is no conclusive explanation for the appearance of new qualities with an increase of complexity. This can not conceal the mystical connotation sometimes given to the term emergence (look at Schmidt-Salomon 1914).

In view of this excessive reductionism and „Ultradarwinism“ (Rose 1998), whose representatives believe that ultimately biology can be established from the perspective of molecular biology, it means a return to many of the so-called „mainstream“ parallel traditions. Especially in German biology, if one refers to Goethe and his efforts to a „holistic“, all intraorganismic interactions taking into account consideration and investigation of living beings in the foreground. This without, however, taking over his mystical views on nature fed by numerous sources, above all by Spinoza and the Romantic Natural Philosophy.

Earlier looks at creativity

The continuous processuality and creative change in the world had been noticed and presented by many thinkers. On two of them, Schelling and Whitehead, may be mentioned here.

Schelling lived long before Whitehead, Whitehead never took note of Schelling’s thinking. Nevertheless, one will discover a common ground when reading both. For them, creativity in nature was a major concern of thought. However, a creativity that not only affected the biological level described above, but also all levels of being, nature as a whole.

Friedrich Wilhelm Josef Schelling (1775 – 1854)

In response to the mechanistic dissection and dissolution of the world and of nature through rationalism, a natural philosophy developed within the framework of Romanticism, whose main exponent is Schelling. Schelling was originally in the tradition of Kant and partly also Fichte (v. Aster 1925, Gulyga 1990), whose decidedly subjectivist epistemology he did not share. He focused his interest very much on the natural sciences, which were developing rapidly during his time, and which included physics and chemistry. The development of the steam engine Lavoisieur’s water synthesis, as well as the dispute between Volta and Galvani on animal electricity formed the background for his speculations, which should be further developed in a natural-philosophical system. Schelling, who describes his fundamental ideas of natural philosophy as „speculative physics,“ proceeds from the tension between the necessity, due to his spiritual origin, to formulate statements or sentences a priori as the absolutely valid foundations of all philosophical and scientific activity, and, on the other hand, the role of experience (- science), or empiricism (Schelling 1988, 24-27). He removes this tension by fundamentally emphasizing the necessity of empiricism, declaring it to be the basis of all knowledge, and then presenting, as a priori valid, those empirical cognitions whose inner necessity is obvious (see 27).

Schelling further concludes that it must necessarily be possible to describe every natural phenomenon (which is described a priori with sentences) To recognize as „absolutely necessary“; for if there is no coincidence in nature, then no primordial phenomenon of nature can be accidental. Rather, because nature is a system, everything that happens or occurs in it must have a necessary connection in one give the whole nature cohesive principle. The insight into this inner necessity of all natural phenomena, of course, becomes even more perfect when one considers that there is no true system which is not at the same time an organic whole. “ But if, Schelling concludes, „In every organic whole everything carries and supports each other mutually, so this organization as a whole had to preexist its parts …“ So nature is not known apriori, but according to Schelling it is apripori (see 28). But in addition to the a priori forms of intuition and categories of thought presented by Kant, which are not necessarily required of their natural inwardness, they have adopted a nature assumed as a priori, which exists (and evolves) in its form of existence (and development) independently of the cognizing subject. From this starting point, a comprehensive connection of all natural phenomena via intermediate links is postulated, whose number can be arbitrarily large. These intermediate links may well be unknown to Schelling. It is the task of experimental natural science to find it.

This is where a critique of contemporary physics sets in, operating with few basic forces and describing nothing but changes in space fulfillment (see 30). According to Schelling, however, the basic forces mentioned are only decays of the one natural process that would not be recognized in this way. Schelling therefore demands (see 31) that instead of the criticized „dynamic way of thinking“ a separate, more comprehensive one should be put forward. In contrast to empiricism (which is to be undressed from any theory), „science now considers its object to be becoming and to be brought about first.“ „… because science can not assume anything, what product, d. H. Thing is, so must it proceed from the unconditioned „. Thus, the „unconditioned in science“ must be examined (see 32). Everything that is, according to Schelling, is a conditioned nature; the unconditioned is being itself. The individual being lets „think as a conditioned one only as a definite restriction of the productive activity (the sole and ultimate substratum of all reality).“ If the whole of objects is understood as the essence of being, then it becomes a mere product (natura naturata). If it is set as productive, then the sub-nature (natura naturans) comes to light. Nature is originally only productivity. This productivity is considered to be infinite, and this implies the problem that from such a point of view an infinite speed of development could be deduced. But this would make it impossible to perceive objects of a certain, at least apparent, temporary constancy (see 37). This kind of „Tardity“ is presented as „infinitely small-speed evolution“. Its cause lies ultimately in a suspension of the pure identity of nature (= productivity), nature must become the object itself. The result is a „duplicity of nature“ (see 38) as a prerequisite for the appearance of objects.

Productivity must be opposed to a negative, „anti-productive“ tendency if passivity is not to be introduced as a constitutive property. For Schelling, the product (of nature) is originally nothing but a mere point of inhibition. „… only when nature struggles against this point does it become as it were a fulfilled sphere, a product as it were.“ This statement is followed by a comparison with a vortex of water, which constantly arises there and disappears, where it encounters resistance. These are now thought of as being in constant redevelopment and annihilation. Productivity splits in opposite directions at every stage of development (see 53). The product itself also splits into individual products. Their constant further change, which is perceived as stability, is now secured by a third, fixing principle. Schelling sees the deepest stage of matter brought to light. By abolishing that third principle, matter can now be elevated to higher potency. This results in diversity. Diversity in the products as expression of different levels of materiality. This difference results in a „dynamic sequence of those products“. Productivity, since it is inherent to nature, enters into products (see 54). This, however, leads to the risk of exhaustion of productivity in the product (see 55). This is countered by (hypothetical) external influences on the product, which force a constant self-reproduction. In pure productivity, however, nature does not exhaust itself. Influences can be exerted by the product to the outside and from the outside to the inside, indeed the latter follow almost from the former. The resulting opposition results in the phenomena of life that would otherwise be mere activity or receptivity.

Owing to externally enforced productivity, the product thus become productive rises to a higher level, to a „second power,“ whereby the organic differs from the inorganic nature.

Constant emergence of new opposites and their suspension in indifference drive production forward. It goes through higher levels of being.

Each of them reverses the previous one. From the unity of the product, magnetism follows as the first step, the dissolution of this unity gives the electricity and the unity of the products finally the chemical process (see 70).

These three levels, however, now have higher powers. As such, the sensitivity to magnetism, the irritability of electricity, and the instinct of education are, as it were, saddled up to the chemical process. 79). They can in turn be influenced by the „galvanism“.

Thus, on the one hand, nature is unified by Schelling, the „difference between organic and inorganic nature“ is „only in nature as an object,“ while „nature hovers as originally productive above both“ (see 79).

On the other hand, its processual moment is emphasized, the general development is understood as a permamentary evolutionary process, whereby evolution is here understood in a much more comprehensive sense than in the then not yet decidedly asserted biological evolution.

The relatively long treatment of Schelling’s core theses leads first to a deeper understanding, on the one hand, of his statements about the nature of organisms and, on the other hand, of their reception and interpretation.

The question arises as to whether Schelling’s philosophy presented a consistent organism model, whether it continued to function, and, above all, whether it is gaining in relevance for today’s discussion.

Schelling, as Heuser (1994) describes, goes beyond the linear combination of cause and effect, as does the mechanism of inanimate nature with its governing external causes, and postulates a new, cyclical form for organic nature the effectiveness, which consists in each of the consequence of a cause having an effect on it. He writes:

„But the mechanism alone is far from anything that makes up nature. for as soon as we transgress into the realm of organic nature, for us all the mechanical connection between cause and effect ceases. „The organic“ produces itself, springs from itself; every single plant is only the product of an individual of its kind, and so every single organization infinitely produces only its species. So no organization goes on, but always goes back into infinity „(Schelling 1988).Within these cycles there are still the linear cause-effect chains, but these become infinitesimal lines.Within a „community sphere“ of organisms, therefore, mechanical processes quite definitely take place and change, but precisely this sphere forms the permanent and perennial.This stands, as it were, for an „idea“ or a „concept“ of nature, which is imprinted on matter or which arranges and guides certain processes in a coherent whole (Schelling 1988)..In this respect, these concepts, which can also be interpreted as natural processes, are inherent in the organic, this„… organizes itself, is not just a work of art whose concept exists outside of it in the mind of the artist“ (Schelling 1988).As Heuser-Kessler points out, from this point of view a developmental tendency intrinsic to nature itself, results in a critical attitude towards contemporary vitalism, which is an additional force in organisms or organisms that can no longer be determined by scientific methods of organic matter must postulate.In many ways, Heuser-Kessler places Schelling’s concept of self-organization in relation to the theories of autopoiesis Maturana (1985 a, b), Maturana & Varela (1980, 1990) which flourished in the 1980s and the 1990s.Although the Schelling interpretation of Heuser-Kessler may explain the inner interaction in the organisms, the dynamics, which plays a paramount role as a „natura naturans“ in Schelling, are not considered enough or not at all. For this reason, Heuser-Kessler also consistently overlooks the fact that the self-organization theories to which she refers ignore just this important attribute as well.

This special conception of nature allows Schelling to see a continuous connection between all levels of being, between inorganic and organic. He speaks of a world soul. A world soul in an organism-like world. In the last paragraph of his Treatise on the World Soul, published in 1798, he characterizes its nature and action as follows:

“Since this principle maintains the continuity of the Anorgian and the organic world, and unites all nature into a general organism, we recognize once more in it the essence which, in anticipation of the earliest philosophy, greeted the common soul of nature, and some physicists of that time with the formative and forming ether (the share of the noblest natures) considered one” (Schelling 1798).[9]

On the other hand, it must be stated that Schelling himself does not understand himself as an exact natural scientist (also in the sense of that time), but regards his method as „speculative.“ This makes him a forerunner of A. Whitehead, despite numerous differences and a little uniform nature.

Alfred North Whithehead (1861 – 1947)

In the Western philosophy of nature, as far as this term may be permitted, the organizational philosophy A. N. Whiteheads occupies a special position. It seeks to unite epistemology and cognitive criticism on the one hand, and the observational and experimental empirical sciences on the other, which have been virtually separate in the western world since the early modern period. He also considers mental processes, cognition and aspirations, as integral parts of the world, trying to overcome the dualistic division of the world into the subjective aspects of the human psyche and the material world, the Cartesian res cogitans and res extensa. Although the terminology of Whitehead often seems alien and probably represents the main difficulty in the preparation of his work, especially in this philosophy are numerous approaches for a better understanding and comprehension not only of the physical, but also the biological world.

Among other things, Whitehead’s aim is to present various different physical world views, including the image of everyday physics as well as that of Newtonian mechanics, the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics, as different abstractions from a comprehensive reality. This is not only intended to bring about a unification of the world itself, but also to juxtapose and contrast the various physics which it unites into a so-called „panphysics“ (Hampe 1998) as equal points of view.

A different view of nature as well as the process of perception and cognition serves him for this purpose.

At Whitehead, nature is perceived as primarily processual in strict rejection of any substance metaphysics or the mass-point or „pebble“ materialism disseminated in Newtonian mechanics. Until now, materialism, according to Whitehead, is the result of so-called displaced concretness. H. In fact, the apparent stability, density, and impenetrability of matter is based on the existence of self-contained and unchanging mass units, which attract or detract from each other, and thus, as a kind of resultant, bring about natural events in the world , That this view, which originated from the Cartesian dualism, as Hans Jonas (1973) shows us in particular very clear.

A different view of nature as well as the process of perception and cognition serves him for this purpose.

For Whitehead, the world as a whole and in its parts is written processually. There is no standstill, no stability in the sense of stagnation is apparent. In fact, what is called matter has a processual, vibratory character (Whitehead 19, SMW). It has the character of events or real events (actual events). However, this characterization does not only apply to material objects and processes, but also to mental and mental ones. Even the consciousness of a person at a certain moment is such a real event. Events are in each case something like nodes of other events that grow together (‚concrescence’), whereby each event reflects and is shaped by its own presuppositions in the form of ‘prehension’. However, since the processual process takes place permanently, every achieved order and every event becomes itself again the basis and presupposition of new conversion processes, event relations and order states. They determine and limit potential fields of future developments. These in turn are shaped by the past. This, however, not in the sense of a rigid, clockwork-like development, but in the sense of limited creative freedom.

Creativity plays the prominent role in Whitehead’s philosophy par excellence. He wrote:

„‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.

‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it uniﬁes.

Thus ‘creativity’ introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative advance’ is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.“ (Whitehead 1960, Process and Reality)[10]

In this way, on the one hand, there is a kind of universal „inheritance“, ie an embossing of events and also organismisms in the broadest sense through the past. Since this principle is consistently effective, the science of Whitehead shows in all its disciplines historically written. On the other hand, this ultimately creates a universal world context in which every real event indirectly reflects the entire development of the world. This is a kind of monadenic existence in the Leibnizian sense. The Leibniz Modades also reflect the entire world more or less perfectly, but unlike Whitehead, Leibniz firstly assumes a parallel development of the spiritual and material worlds and the eternity of the monads.

Conclusion and outlook
The philosophy of Schelling Whiteheads shows with great clarity and conciseness that there is an alternative tradition to the mainstream of European natural science and philosophy. An alternative development based on conditions other than the mechanistic sciences, which has long included biology.
For them, a constantly changing world and autonomous organisms are in the foreground. These organisms are also constantly changing. We live in the changing, evolving nature. This omnipresent momentum can be seen as a creative tendency.
Creativity characterizes all events in the world, even if this is not immediately apparent, as in some parts of the physical world or in plants. However, this is due to the low speed of many processes for our perception.
The alternative tradition in the sciences was never ended. Worth mentioning in this connection are the names Karl Ernst von Baer, Jakob von Uexküll, Jan Christian Smuts, Hans Jonas, Haldane Adolf Mayer-Abich and Ludwig von Bertalanffy.
Today, development is increasingly gaining in energy. An impressive example in this context is the biosemiotics, which is being developed by Kalevi Kull in Estonia.

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[1] Inhabitant of Leonding/Austria, formerly Curator Museum of Natural History, Vienna and Lector at the University of Vienna.

[3] quoted from H. R. Fischer (Ed.) (1997), p. 47.

[4] Quoted from: Remigius Stölzle (Ed.) Karl Ernst von Baers Schriften. – Greiner & Pfeifer, Stuttgart, 155.

[5] the gray section is already quoted in the introduction.

[6] A new edition of this three-volume work was published in 2010 by Felix Meiner, Hamburg.

[7] Quoted from Müller-Herold 1988

[8] A comprehensive introduction was given by Jantsch (1980).

[9] Quoteed from Schelling 1798, Projekt Gutenberg.

[10] Quoted from Northrop & Gross (Eds.) (1960).

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